Indonesian judges are permitted to issue dissenting opinions. Constitutional Court judges regularly hand them down. However, neither judges nor academics have outlined the purposes of dissenting opinions in Indonesia. This article aims to promote discussion about what these purposes are, or should be, in Indonesia, with a view to increasing the utility of dissents. It begins by considering the international scholarly literature details some purposes recognised in other countries, such as increased transparency and accountability, but also some disadvantages, such as the perceived weakness of a divided court. It then considers how the Constitutional employs dissents, before exploring some of the uncertainties and unanswered questions about dissents and their use in Indonesia.
I. INTRODUCTION
The judgments of Indonesia's Constitutional Court often contain 'dissenting opinions' (pendapat berbeda). In them, one of more judges writes reasons indicating why they would have decided the case differently to the way a majority of the Court decided it. However, there is, to my knowledge, no consensus amongst Indonesian judges and academics about the significance and purpose of dissents. In one sense, this is unsurprising: publishing dissenting opinions alongside majority or other opinions in a single judgement document have long been a feature of the common law tradition. Yet Indonesia is a civil law country.
The main exception of the Constitutional Court, which appears to issue them in roughly 13% of cases. Yet even here, dissents are not always used for the same purposes as they are used for in courts of other countries, particularly common law countries, but also some civil law countries. In this article, the author aims to demonstrate how the Constitutional Court uses dissents and how it could use them to further enhance the transparency and accountability of its decision-making.
In setion 1, the discussion is begun by explaining the common law's approach and the civil law tradition's general aversion to dissenting judgments, noting the movement in many civil law countries towards allowing dissents. The author also examines some of the scholarly literature that covers perceived advantages and disadvantages of dissents. Furthermore, in section 2, the circumstances behind the introduction of dissenting opinions in Indonesia are outlined, first in the commercial courts (pengadilan niaga), then in the ordinary courts and, of course, the Constitutional Court. Finally, in section 3, the author considers how the Indonesian Constitutional Court uses dissenting opinions and highlights two fundamental but unanswered questions: what is the weight of a dissenting opinion and when should the Constitutional Court consider itself to be 'split'?
II. DISCUSSION

Dissents in the Civil Law Tradition and the Literature
The main purposes of dissents, expressed in legal scholarship, are numerous, though how they are used in a particular country, if at all, is often a matter of legal tradition and legal practice.
The Function of Judicial Dissent in Indonesia's Constitutional Court
Of course, dissenting judgments derive from the English common law tradition, and are deeply ingrained in countries following that tradition, like Australia, Malaysia and the United States. Dissenting opinions developed in the English courts from the end of the 16 th century and then spread to other common law countries. 1 In these places, it is virtually inconceivable for judge to be prevented from expressing their own views if they differ from other judges on the bench. Most common law judges previously worked as barristers, most of who will have built a successful career by making their own legal arguments and being fiercely independent, so being forced to 'conform' feels deeply inappropriate, perhaps even dishonest. Common law judges demand that they must feel free to express their opinions about -say, the identification of the relevant law, the interpretation of that law, and the relevant facts -if they differ from other judges on the panel. Of course, dissents do not create binding precedent, but they have important functions, discussed below, including forming the basis for future legal change.
By contrast, countries following the civil law tradition, including Indonesia, have traditionally prohibited dissents. Some countries even consider it 'unethical' for a judge to openly disagree with other members of the Court. 2 This seems to follow French views on the law and the role of judges in applying it. During the Napoleonic period, a Civil Code was developed that was thought to be so perfect and complete, and so easy to apply, that it resulted in only one answer to a legal problem. Judging was conceived as a mathematical process that could be performed by a relatively low-ranked administrator. According to the theory, because case outcomes were inevitable, disagreement on the bench was inconceivable, and so judges did not need to be able to give dissenting opinions. So, to borrow the words of Ginsburg, it is easier to maintain the ideal that judges are instruments or 'mouths' of the law and are merely espousing the single true application of the Code.
Of course, these civil law views of codes and courts are now quite old and most civil law countries now recognise that codes are not perfect, and that judging is not a simply mechanical process. Accordingly, many countries have considered giving judges power to issue dissents, at least in some of their courts. Yet even in these courts, disagreements are not always 'visibly displayed in the published decision' . 5 There are some exceptions, however: notably the Constitutional Courts of Germany and Spain, and some courts in South America. 
Scholarly Literature about Dissents
As mentioned, the scholarly literature identifies various advantages and disadvantages of permitting judicial dissents.
Transparency and Legitimacy
If judges can dissent, then they will not usually be required to follow a majority view they think is incorrect. Judges can, therefore, 'do their job' , which is to impartially apply the law. As Lynch describes it:
While certainly 'identification of the applicable law, followed by an application of that law' can occur with unanimity, the reality is that it very often does not -and to no particularly ill effect. This is because there is much legitimate scope for disagreement over the law. application of the law. In short, the possibility of dissenting opinions ensures that judicial power is in fact − and is seen to be − exercised with an appropriate focus upon the law, rather than being simply a smokescreen for decisions based upon morality, economics or public policy. Related benefits appear to be judicial independence, or at least an enhanced perception of independence. Again, Lynch points out:
The presence of dissenting judgments is one factor which provides reassurance that the courts are staffed by judges beholden to nothing more powerful than their own individual appreciation of the state of the law. If the judges are prepared to disagree with each other on occasion, then it seems reasonable to presume they will have no qualms about disagreeing with the executive and legislature as well when the need arises. 
Enhanced Judicial Accountability
Many scholars argue that dissents perform an important accountability function too.
12 In many common law countries, judges circulate draft decisions for other judges to read before they are finalised. Many judges say that this process forces majority judges to better justify their decisions before they issue them.
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As former Ginsburg puts it:
My experience teaches that there is nothing better than an impressive dissent to lead the author of the majority opinion to refine and clarify her initial circulation. In some cases, the legislature has also adopted reasoning contained in a dissenting opinion. 
Disadvantages of Dissent
Dissent also brings with it several consequences which, in many countries -both civil and common law -are considered disadvantages.
Perhaps the most significant problem is that it indicates a divided court, with some commentators taking this to mean that the Court is weak or that its decisions lack authority, or at least appears to be. 19 By contrast, unanimous courts can create an impression of strength and stability, and security in the law interpreted and even created by that court. 20 In courts where dissent is permitted and is commonly employed, unanimous decisions can be used to 'make a statement' -about an important area of law or to resolve long-standing uncertainty, for example -simply because all of the judges agree with it. Even though this view is commonly associated with the 
History of Dissents in Indonesia
In the lead-up to dissenting opinions being permitted in Indonesia in commercial courts (from 2000 and more generally from 2004), there was relatively little advocacy or discussion about the utility of allowing dissents. from Java find that the part of the woman is half of the part of the estate, whereas the Padang judge issues a dissenting opinion that is known to the public. In this case, it is possible that those who feel defeated (Padang) will say that because the majority of judges are Javanese, their case was defeated (regional sentiment emerges).
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It was also predicted that the paternalistic tradition whereby junior judges agree with the opinions of senior judges and Associate Justices routinely follow the Chief Justice would impede the 'take up' of dissenting judgments in Indonesia's courts and undermine their utility. This concern was echoed by another commentator, who also highlighted that the potential for disagreement on the bench might not be well received by the public, because it gave the impression of inconsistency in judicial decision-making and must undermine the legitimacy of the courts. However, given the title of the Regulation, there was some confusion about whether this Regulation applied only to ad hoc judges or to all commercial court judges. On the one hand, most of the Regulation appeared directed towards ad hoc judges in the commercial courts, but, on the other, the provisions dealing with dissenting opinions (Articles 9-11) were cast in general terms and could be interpreted as applying to all judges in the commercial courts. Some interpreted (2), (3) and (4) of the Judicial Power Law and Articles 30 (3), (4) and (5) These laws extended the ability to dissent to all Indonesian judges. However, these statutes did not explain the rationale for doing so. There was, therefore, very little context for these reforms: while judges knew they could dissent, they did not necessarily know why this reform had been made and why it might be important. This might help explain why so few Indonesian courts tend to issue dissents, at least on a regular basis.
Indonesia Dissent Data
There is very limited data about the rate of dissents in Indonesian courts, but it seems clear that they are generally rare, except in Constitutional Court. not as strongly supported by Mahfud, who might have been more interested in the Court providing more decisive solutions to the matters brought before it. But this is mere conjecture. What appears certain is that in the past several years the rate of dissents has dropped significantly, though the reasons for this are not known.
How the Constitutional Court has Used Dissents
The Indonesian Constitutional Court appears to use dissents very effectively to make its decisions more transparent and legitimate. Judge seem free to make their own decisions, and can explain the reasons for them. This enables the public to see who agrees with what, and shows the losing side that the court seriously considered at least some of their arguments. This signifies that the court understands that functions are particularly important and that it has enormous responsibilities -including to interpret the constitution and to judge compliance by a democratically elected legislature. Constitutional interpretation is highly contested, and subject to change over time, and so the Court realises weight. 47 Breaking it might be constitutionally inappropriate, but it was not unconstitutional. Echoing the minority in Saurip Kadi-although not explicitly referring to it -the majority declared that even presuming convention could develop such authority, it could not emerge after being practiced only once.
Having established that it was bound by neither the convention it had recognised in Saurip Kadi nor the Saurip Kadi case itself, the majority held that having separate presidential and legislative elections was unconstitutional.
The majority gave three primary justifications, as follows.
45 Constitutional Court Decision 14/PUU-XI/2013. 46 Simultaneous Election Case, 2013, para [3.16] . 47 The Court observed that in some common law countries, convention is neither enforceable in the courts nor binding upon its judges.
The first was the strong presidential system the amended Constitution had established. While the Constitution gives the president significant power, it imposes various checks and balances upon its exercise, beginning with the way the president is chosen and maintains office. The president relies primarily upon public support for legitimacy, being directly voted in by the people. He or she is neither selected by the winning party from amongst its own members, as occurs in parliamentary systems, nor able to be removed by parliament, at least without the Constitutional Court finding him or her guilty of a serious offence. However, this does not mean that the president can ignore the political parties represented in parliament. On a practical level, the president and parliament will often find it convenient to cooperate with each other, to make government run smoothly (though parliament might be reluctant to follow the direction of a president who becomes unpopular, fearing loss of support from the electorate in forthcoming general elections).
Furthermore, potential presidential and vice presidential candidates cannot stand without nomination by political parties, which often emerges after negotiation between the candidate and the party. However, this negotiation process was problematic. For the majority, the Article 6A(2) nomination requirement was aimed at encouraging parties to form stable coalitions. If parties merged or consolidated, this would simplify the party system, and encourage the president and the parties nominating him or her to work together in the interests of the nation. 48 However, in practice the primarily purpose of the negotiation process had become short-term strategic advantage. Parties would form a coalition purely to support a particular candidate and then fracture after disagreeing about other issues.
In the majority's assessment, the system, therefore, had failed to encourage political parties who might otherwise be natural allies from merging or coming together in coalition. In short, holding separate legislative and presidential elections did not promote the checks and balances or the system of government that the Constitution sought to establish. 'Box 1 would be the DPR box, box 2 would be the DPD box, box 3 would be the president/vice president box, box 4 would be the DPRD box, and box 5 would be the county/city box' . 49 According to the Court, this original intent was consistent with Article 22E(2), which defines general elections to include presidential elections. Article 6A(2)'s reference to 'general elections' therefore referred to both legislative and presidential elections.
Finally, the Court justified requiring simultaneous elections by reference to efficiency and cost savings, emphasising that if elections were held together, then more money would be available to meet the core objective of the state -improving public welfare. 50 Voters could also make a more informed about which party to vote for in legislative elections, because parties would need to disclose, before the elections took place, which presidential candidates they supported.
Despite holding that separate presidential and legislative elections were unconstitutional, the Court did not require that elections be held simultaneously in 2014, fearing that this would cause disruption. The KPU had already begun organising separate elections. Perhaps more importantly, Article 22E (6) of the Constitution required that election rules be established 49 Simultaneous Election case, 2013 , p. 83, citing Naskah Komprehensif Perubahan Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia tahun 1945 : Latar Belakang, Proses, dan Hasil Pembahasan, 1999 -2002 intent' in this way was incisive and far more convincing than the majority's application of it. Yet because the majority and minority did not engage, the majority was able to 'get away with' this. The judicial accountability purpose of dissents was not taken advantage of.
Unanswered Questions About Dissents in the Constitutional Court;
What is the Weight of a Dissent?
Instinctively it is tempting, particularly from a common law perspective, to consider that the 'strength' of a majority judgment is diluted the more dissenting opinions that are issued against it. While this issue is considered fundamental in many countries, there has been no discussion, let alone agreement, in Indonesia about the relative weight or authority of unanimous decisions compared with split decisions. Indeed, in some cases previous dissents have been given no weight. Articles 18(5) and (6) read:
(5) Regional governments are to exercise wide-ranging autonomy, except in matters that national legislation reserves for the Central Government. (6) Regional governments have power to enact regional regulations (Perda) and other regulations in the exercise of their autonomy and assistance.
From the outset, the designers of regional autonomy recognised that provincial, county and city lawmakers would need help to draft Perda. After all, these lawmakers had very few skills or experience in formulating policy, let alone drafting laws to give legal effect to it. The 1999 Law therefore required subnational governments to send their Perda after enactment for 'evaluation' . 
